Elaborating on the circumstances that led to the 1999 Kargil war, former Army Chief NC Vij (retd) writes in his new book ‘Alone in the Ring’ that intelligence agencies had “gravely failed to detect the large purchases of winter fighting equipment from international weapons markets by Pakistan” and “inaccurate assessment” of the Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW) that there was no possibility of a war with Pakistan in the current year.
The book, yet to be released, also dwells upon the lessons from the war at a time when India is gearing up to mark 25 years of Kargil Vijay Diwas on July 26.
Gen Vij was DG of Military Operations during the Kargil war and Vice Chief of Army Staff during Operation Parakram, following the terrorist attack on the Parliament, and coordinated the largest mobilisation of the Army.
In his book, Gen Vij writes that the Pakistan Army had the advantage of surprise in the beginning and India was caught unawares due to an intelligence failure. “Not only was the intrusion detected late, but also our intelligence agencies were unable to assess if the intrusion was by militants or the Pakistan Army,” he noted, adding that there was, however, an acute shortage of high-quality surveillance equipment at the time and the Army was particularly poorly equipped for surveillance operations.
He said it was also militarily difficult to anticipate that Pakistan would launch such a risky operation at high altitudes in extreme weather with little possibility of big gains, but the intelligence agencies gravely failed to detect the large purchases of winter fighting equipment from international weapons markets by Pakistan.
“The assessment of R&AW was categorically that ‘there was no possibility of a war with Pakistan in the current year’. This inaccurate assessment resulted in a strategic failure,” he writes.
The book also highlights that the Kargil Review Committee had held R&AW primarily responsible for the intelligence failure besides the lack of information sharing and coordination among agencies. “They had failed to detect a change in the deployment of battalions in the area and the addition of one battalion to the force level normally deployed there. The committee also held military intelligence responsible to a lesser extent for not detecting the intrusion on the ground,” it stated.
“The KRC concluded that intelligence failure was the single major factor leading to the Kargil conflict,” the book noted.
Gen Vij noted that the Government of India could not have anticipated the possibility of a war so soon after the Lahore Declaration and then Prime Minister Atal Bihar Vajpayee was trying to find ways to peace through the track-2 interlocutor RK Mishra. “Eventually, this dialogue also stopped. The military was not in the loop at that stage. We had gone wrong in judging Pakistan’s intentions.”
Speaking about Operation Parakram in the aftermath of the 2001 Parliament attack, he noted it was essential for national security agencies to share with the armed forces the collated multi-agency intelligence inputs on possible Pakistani responses and their capabilities, but no threat assessment analysis was provided.
“The lack of clarity within the Union Cabinet on its war objectives may have undermined Operation Parakram from the outset. No specific political or military objectives were laid down by the national political leadership and hence the armed forces were forced to draw their own strategies from minimal inputs during the period of build-up,” he writes.
He said that the Operation Parakram period saw an indecisive leadership. He writes that during the Kargil war, India demonstrated resolute politico-diplomatic leadership and therefore, it was surprising to find dynamism and clarity lacking during Operation Parakram.
He said the government was politically weak due to several internal factors, including economic ones, including the cost of the operation running into billions of dollars, the American threat of economic restrictions and the departure of international businesspeople from India.
“Whatever the reasons for India turning away from a war it was committed to start, the leadership dithered, delayed and lacked clarity on how to proceed even when the armed forces were battle-ready,” he said.
He said no nation can afford such a wavering approach after such a large mobilisation. “The war hysteria persisted for ten long months, but the Army did not march forward as it kept waiting for the directive from the government. Having failed to dissuade Pakistan to stop its proxy war for over a decade – including the limited yet costly conflict in Kargil – the logical political aim should have been to force compellence on Pakistan by punitive strikes on their territory and by liberating as much of POK as possible.”
He said, “the only objective met by the Operation was to draw global attention to the dastardly attack on the Parliament and display Indian resolve for self-defence, but it came at a prohibitive cost.”
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